Indiana Harbor

March 6, 1976: Indiana Port History Exemplifies Clash Conservation-Industry Forces Engage In Tug-Of-War Over Use Of Dunal Area

Originally published in The Vidette-Messenger of Porter County on March 6, 1976.

Indiana Port History Exemplifies Clash

Conservation-Industry Forces Engage In Tug-Of-War Over Use Of Dunal Area

By MARTIN ZIMMERMAN


PORTER COUNTY’S 15 miles of Lake Michigan shoreline has long been a battleground for the traditional struggle between environmental and industrial interests. By being blessed both with the beautiful and valuable duneland and an ideal location for heavy industrial development, the county has often found itself cursed with the dilemma of having one or the other, but not both.

Perhaps no other chapter in the colorful history of the dune-covered shoreline better illustrates this dilemma than the 150-year battle to establish a deep-water port in the area. First envisioned early in the 19th century, the port and its proponents suffered through 100 years of government inertia until, with progress finally being made, conservationists marshaled their forces and put up such bitter opposition that it appeared for a while that the century-and-a-half old dream would never become a reality.

The story of what was eventually to become the Burns Waterway Harbor began even before Indiana was admitted to the Union in 1816. In 1805, what is now Porter County’s northern boundary was purchased from the state of Michigan by the territorial government so Indiana would have an outlet to the Great Lakes. The first white settler in the area, French trapper Joseph Bailly, recognized the potential of Indiana’s lake Michigan shoreline and as early as 1822 he made plans for establishing a port at the mouth of the Grand Calumet River.

Although nothing ever came of Bailly’s dream, in 1832 Congress sent Sen. Daniel Webster to northern Indiana to inspect prospective sites for a major Great lake port. Webster was in favor of City Westーlocated near present day Tremontーas the site for the port, but Michigan City and Chicagoー then a town of under 300ーreceived the approval and the appropriations for harbor development. By-passed by Congress, City West lost its reason for existence and soon died out, and Porter County would wait more than a century for another chance at a port.

FOR THE NEXT 50 years, northern Indiana sat idly by as Chicago boomed. Without sufficient port facilities, Porter County could not persuade industry to settle within its boundaries. When Standard Oil and United States Steel finally opened plants in Lake County early in the 20th Century, they built private ports for their own use rather than fight for a public harbor.

In 1906, however, dreams of an Indiana port were revived when Randall Burns, a leading farmer and landowner in the area, proposed the digging of a channel to drain the marshy land around Gary. because of legal entanglements, the waterway was not completed until 1926, but it was a milestone in the history of the future port. Lawrence Preston of Indiana University, in his book on the harbor, said, “It gave the future harbor the name ‘Burns’ ...and made the project appear more plausible by delineating the locale for its fulfillment.”

In 1928, supporters of the port received a shot in the arm when the National Steel Corporation purchased 750 acres of duneland for eventual construction of a complete steel mill. National’s proposal to build a port at the mouth of Burns Ditch was found unacceptable, however, as it was thought the mills would make the port inaccessible to the general public.

In 1935, harbor proponents were brought together by the Valparaiso Chamber of Commerce to form the Northern Industrial Development Association (NIDA), which consisted of members from Porter, LaPorte and Lake counties. Later the same year, U.S. Rep. Charles A. Halleck pushed a resolution through the House committee on Rivers and Harbors authorizing the Army Corps of Engineers to hold a hearing on a possible harbor. The hearing brought together many Indiana officials and concerned citizens, including Gov. Paul McNutt, but the harbor proposal was turned down on the grounds of insufficient public benefit. An appeal to the decision was also turned down, this time with a recommendation from the federal government that a site other than the Burns Ditch location under consideration be tried.

HALLECK TRIED AGAIN in 1937 by sponsoring a bill to authorize the Secretary of War to survey the northern Indiana area for possible harbor sites. The Corps of Engineers made the survey in 1938, but returned an unfavorable report, citing the lack of definite need and economic justification as their reasons.

Stymied on the federal level, the NIDA next turned to the state legislature, where a bill was passed in 1938 creating the Indiana Board of Public Harbors and Terminals. The same legislation also provided for a token appropriation for harbor development to show the Corps of Engineers that Indiana was indeed serious in its desire for a port. In 1940, however, a state of national emergency was declared and the engineers shelved all civil works until after the war.

During the war little progress was made in the campaign for a port, although the harbor board did initiate studies to collect data on the feasibility of a Lake Michigan outlet. The collected data was utilized in 1948 when Gov. Ralph Gates arranged a meeting between the board and the Indiana Economic Council to study the potential value of a port.

In July, 1949, a public meeting was held in Gary at which the harbor board set forth a nine-point argument in favor of a port. For the first time, however, conservationists who saw the port as a threat to the dunes surfaced as a very vocal opposition force. Despite criticism from the dune-lovers, a favorable report was issued and the Corps of Engineers was asked to perform yet another survey of proposed port sites. The Korean War interrupted, however, and in desperation Gov. George Craig asked the state to pay for its own survey. The state assembly did not appropriate the necessary funds and again the port was put on the shelf.

IN LATE 1955 and early 1956, two more economic feasibility studies were made and both returned favorable reports. Also included in one report was an estimate of the cost for building the port, which at this time was projected to be $18 million.

As 1956 progressed, however, it became clear that Indiana’s hopes for a port were heavily reliant on whether National Steel would build a steel mill near the site. Otherwise, the Corps of Engineers would not approve the project as economically feasible. National refused to make any sort of commitment, but in August, Bethlehem Steel Corporation bought several thousand acres of land near the National holdings and announced plans not only to build a mill but also to make part of the acreage available for a public harbor.

Further impetus was received the same year when both houses of Congress authorized theor Public Works committees to study all Great Lakes harbors in preparation for the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The chief engineer of the Army agreed to combine the study of the Burns Waterway Harbor originally proposed in 1951 with the larger study, and this interim report resulted four years later in the first official approval of a deep-water port in the waterway area.

Meanwhile, in January, 1957, Indiana appropriated $2 million for land purchase for the harbor, and Gov. Harold Handley continued to push the steel companies for a definite commitment. At the same time, another economic feasibility study was performed by Joseph Hartley of Indiana University which would take into account the St. Lawrence Seaway.

The Hartley Report, completed in mid-1959, pointed out in great detail the possib;e benefits of a port to the state and estimated the cost of such a port at $36 million.

WHEN THE HARTLEY report was made public, Gov. Handley also announced a new site for the port between the holdings of National and Bethlehem. The state also received a definite commitment from National to build a steel mill at the site, a decision which prompted the district Army engineer to finally approve the port and to reaffirm the economic benefits of such a venture. Shortly thereafter, the division engineer also approved the project.

With the approval of the Corps of Engineers, harbor proponents began to feel that success was near. But as the 1960s dawned, it became obvious that the real fight was just beginning. Rallying behind the leadership of Illinois Sen. Paul Douglas, the Save the Dunes Council began agitating to have the site of the port shifted away from the dunes area, and succeeded in having the favorable report channelled back to the district engineer.

To escape opposition from the dunelovers, the Indiana Port Commission, formed in 1961, recommended that the state build the port itself, thereby bypassing the federal government, where the dunes council had planned to fight the port. In an attempt to bring the two sides together, Indiana Sen. Vance Hartke introduced legislation that provided for both a port and a national park in Porter County. Douglas, however, introduced a bill which called for a park only, and action on the two bills soon became impossible.

Bogged down again on the federal level, the Indiana Port Commission took the initiative and began to buy land for the port. At the same time, Bethlehem announced plans for a complete mill near the harbor site, which became important in 1963 when the Chief of Army Engineers recommended that the port not be approved unless the adjacent areas were industrialized. The Bureau of the Budget studied the recommendation and Bethlehem’s commitment and then gave its approval for the port. Sens. Birch Bayh and Hartke introduced a bill for federal participation in the building of the port, but it was not passed in 1963 or 1964.

IN 1965, after lengthy debate, the U.S. House and Senate both passed bills authorizing the harbor, but differences in the bills had to be reconciled before they could be signed into law. The Senate bill contained a proviso that stated no money could be spent on the harbor until a national lakeshore was established to protect the surrounding dune areas. The House version merely provided that steps be taken to insure that the dunes were not harmed by the port. A compromise was worked out in October which provided only that a vote be taken on the national park proposal, thereby making federal appropriations for the harbors no longer contingent upon passage of the park bill.

With this roadblock removed, the port bill was quickly passed by Congress, thereby conferring official authorization on the Burns Harbor project. In May, 1966, the Army Corps of Engineers gave the final confirmation of federal support for the harbor, and ground was broken in October of that year.

On Sept. 11, 1969, a Bethlehem ore boar discharged its load of iron ore at the steel company’s dock and thereby became the first vessel to use the port. After a century and a half of frustration, disappointment and perseverance, Indiana’s dream of a water outlet to the trade of the world was a reality.

Feb. 5, 1966: Trails Said Port Threat

Originally published in The Vidette-Messenger of Porter County on February 5, 1966.

Trails Said Port Threat

‘DOUGLAS WALL’ーCartoonist offers conception of how non-contiguous areas crisscrossed with trails in southern fringe of proposed Lakeshore acreage will bottle development of harbor and industry. Harbor opponents see this as maneuver by Illinois Sen. …

‘DOUGLAS WALL’ーCartoonist offers conception of how non-contiguous areas crisscrossed with trails in southern fringe of proposed Lakeshore acreage will bottle development of harbor and industry. Harbor opponents see this as maneuver by Illinois Sen. Paul Douglas to whittle down economic development in Indiana, thereby aiding Illinois industry, hence name ‘Douglas Wall’.

One of the major bones of contention between proponents of the Indiana harbor, now under construction in North Porter county, and supporters of the proposed Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, soon to be the subject of a House hearing in Washington, is the so-called non-contiguous areas.

The average person, when referring to the lakeshore, often thinks about the land and the sand stretching immediately south of the shore of Lake Michigan, but gives little thought to those marshy areas on the southern fringe of the 11,000-acre parcel.

In S. 360 ー the bill which seeks to establish the lakeshore ー the non-contiguous areas are referred to as “hinterland”.

Supporters of the harbor see in these fringe properties a sharp lever by seaport foes to reduce Indiana’s harbor from a first rate to a third rate facility, because they feel it will strangle their economic development.

For this maneuver ー as well as the many other delaying tactics that have been hurled at the seaport ー they blame Illinois Sen. Paul Douglas. Hence they refer to this southern zone as the “Douglas Wall”.

S. 360 does not clearly define the intent of those “hinterlands” other than that they obviously are to be used to preserve the flora and fauna and for the establishment of trails.

Harbor enthusiasts see in this area only one of the cloudy phases of S. 360. However, some light is believed shed on the federal government’s intent for this area by a portion of this testimony at the Feb. 8, 1965 Senate Subcommittee hearing in Washington.

The report on that hearing includes pertinent testimony offered by George B. Hartzog, Jr., director of the National Park Service. His answer followed a question asked by Sen. Alan Bible, of Nevada, chairman of the subcommittee which held the hearing.

Asked Sen. Bible:

“The problems, I think, that have concerned the committee about these so-called non-contiguous areas: No. 1, the distance from the lake, and No. 2, the fact that you have to go over three railroad tracks and two highways to get there.

“Is this correct? How many highways and how many railroads are there between the lake and these noncontiguous areas?”

Hartzog never quite got around to answering Sen. Bible’s direct question, but this was his reply:

“Sir, our thinking has been that the roads and railroad tracks would either be overpassed or underpassed with trail systems in order to connect the areas of the natural lakeshore.

“We have somewhat the same situation, for example, at Chalmette National Historical Park in Louisiana, where an industrial use road separates the battlefield, for example, from the river.

“We are working on a plan now to provide access to visitors across this road. This is a problem, but we don’t believe it is insurmountable.”


Project Expensive

Sen. Bible: “Do you have any cost figures on this? I suppose if you have an overpass or underpass it gets a little expensive, doesn’t it?”

Hartzog: “Yes, sir. The development schedule is indicated in the book. The development cost is about $5,700,000, and thisー”

Bible: “I'm sorry. I did not hear you.”

Hartzog: “About $5,760,000. This includes roads and trails that would be necessary for access among these detached units.”

Bible: “Now, is that the total cost of developing the non-contiguous areas, the $5.7 million?”

5 Year Figure

Hartzog: “Yes. During the 5 years. This is the first 5-year cost figure that we supplied.”

Bible: “Just for these areas along?”

Hartzog: “No. This is all development.”

Bible: “This is what I was trying to develop. How much does it cost to develop these and how much does it cost to build the trails and overpasses and underpasses to them? Do you have that breakdown?”

Hartzog: “We don’t have it broken down here precisely as to what part relates to the detached areas and what part is inside the main body of the national seashore.

Roads, Trails

“However, in the breakdown we show $15,000 in the first year for roads, $550,000 for roads and trails in the second year, the same amount in the third year, and $250,000 in the fourth year.

“So this would be roughly $1,365,000 for roads and trails. All of this would not be, however, solely for the purpose of linking up the detached units. There would be some trail developments within the principal areas itself.”

Harbor supporters consider this linkup as a scheme by Sen. Douglas to contain economic development in Indiana in order to provide greater industrial advantages to Illinois. That is why they call it the “Douglas Wall”.